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The European Commission published in November 2010 a Communication aiming at putting 
the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) into action. The Communication envisages five key 
strategic objectives for the EU’s internal security: disrupt organised crime, prevent terrorism, 
raise levels of security in cyberspace, strengthen external borders management and increase the 
EU’s resilience to natural disasters. This paper starts by critically examining the extent to which 
these objectives actually constitute shared common concerns in all EU27 member states and 
whether they are based on independent and objective evidence. After demonstrating the 
contrary, we then argue that the ISS should be rather considered as an ‘Internal (In)security 
Strategy’ because of the lack of an accompanying solid rule of law and liberty strategy (model) 
focused on ensuring the delivery to everyone living in the EU (and who will be subject to 
increasing EU internal security policies focused on more surveillance, preventive measures and 
an intelligence-based approach) the twin rights of rule of law and fundamental rights.  
 
 
The CEPS ‘Liberty and Security in Europe’ publication series offers the views and critical 
reflections of CEPS researchers and external collaborators on key policy discussions 
surrounding the construction of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series 
encompasses policy-oriented and interdisciplinary academic studies and commentary 
about the internal and external implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies inside 
Europe and elsewhere throughout the world. 
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Introduction 
The EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) was adopted by the Council in February 2010 under the 
auspices of the Spanish Presidency with a view to setting out a common European Security 
Model.
1 This initial document followed the entry into force of the new treaty setting of the EU, 
brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme 
setting out the new five-year plan for the development of the EU’s Area of Freedom Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) in December 2009. The AFSJ was created by the Amsterdam Treaty 
amendments to the EU treaties in 1999. In its original form, the AFSJ comprised the fields of 
borders, immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation in civil matters in a legally binding form 
(previously called the EU’s “first pillar”), and policing, terrorism and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters in the more intergovernmental venue of the EU (formerly known as the “third 
pillar”). The Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the old pillar structure in Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) policies and brought (to varying degrees and subject to several exceptions) the 
different policy fields of the AFSJ into one fairly homogeneous legal and institutional 
framework. The Commission published in November 2010 a Communication titled ‘The EU 
Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe’ which identifies 
‘the most urgent challenges’ to EU security in the years to come and proposes a shared agenda 
of common strategic objectives and specific actions for the implementation of the ISS between 
2011 and 2014.  
The Stockholm Programme stressed that it “is of paramount importance that law enforcement 
measures, on the one hand, and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and 
international protection rules, on the other, go hand in hand in the same direction and are 
mutually reinforced.”
2 Do the ISS and the Commission Communication ‘putting it into action’ 
fulfil this political priority? This paper argues to the contrary. Both official documents illustrate 
how the insecurity concerns enshrined in the ISS are attempting to take over the EU’s AFSJ 
agenda. Justice is relegated second to the service of security, and individuals’ security and 
liberty remain absent from the overall objectives of the strategy. The concrete steps presented 
by the Commission Communication exclusively serve ‘internal security’ purposes and interests, 
an approach that positions rule of law and fundamental rights (aside from formalistic sentences 
and announcements) at the margins. The Communication advocates a predominant ‘Home 
Affairs model’, based on a number of ‘common threats’ that the Union allegedly faces globally 
and that are said to justify the further integration of security cooperation at EU level in both 
operations and substance. This home affairs model proposed by the Directorate General Home 
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Affairs of the Commission has not been accompanied by (and in our view remains in tension 
with) a credible and sound EU citizenship, fundamental rights and justice strategy meeting the 
liberty-related challenges that a majority of the ISS objectives and policy proposals (especially 
those related to a proactive, intelligence-based approach and a model for information exchange 
as well as the call for further operational integration of EU security agencies) will increasingly 
create to a Europe of law, justice and rights. This, we argue, will constitute one of the main 
challenges for Europe’s future which remains unresolved. Moreover, the ISS and the 
Commission’s vision outlined in the Communication demonstrate that the old third-pillar spirit 
and intergovernmental ways of thinking and working (police-led, secretive and unaccountable) 
are still very much in favour and can be expected to be expanded through their practical 
implementation. 
This Policy Brief constitutes a revised version of written evidence submitted by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Section of CEPS to the inquiry currently carried out by the Select Committee on 
the EU of the UK House of Lords into the Internal Security Strategy. It starts by providing an 
overview of the objectives, principles and guidelines for action outlined in the ISS. The 
Commission Communication putting the ISS into action, and its five key strategic objectives 
(organised crime, terrorism, cybercrime, external borders and natural disasters) is examined in 
Section two. To what extent are these issues shared common concerns in all EU 27 member 
states and based on available evidence? Section three concludes by addressing the question of 
the extent to which the ISS will make the EU more secure or insecure, and it recommends to the 
European Commission to develop a solid rule of law and liberty strategy. 
1.  The Internal Security Strategy: The old Third Pillar through the back 
door? 
The objective of the EU’s ISS is to establish a shared agenda on internal security that enjoys the 
support of all the member states, the EU institutions, civil society and local authorities, and 
interestingly enough, the EU security industry. What the ISS does not include are institutions 
and issues that are associated with external security, such as the military, defence and 
international relations. The ISS identified a number of principles and guidelines for action in 
pursuit of a ‘European security model’.
3 The principles included: 
a.  Justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing whilst respecting 
fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and privacy; 
b.  Protection of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable; 
c.  Transparency and accountability in security policies; 
d.  Dialogue as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles of 
tolerance, respect and freedom of expression; 
e.  Integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination; 
f.  Solidarity between EU member states; and 
g.  Mutual trust. 
On the basis of these principles, the ISS provided a number of guidelines for action “to 
guarantee the EU’s internal security”, which inter alia included a proactive (intelligence-led) 
approach driven by prevention and anticipation, the reinvigoration of information exchange 
between law enforcement authorities through the use of EU databases as well as an improved 
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operation cooperation between EU security agencies (Europol, Eurojust, Cepol, Sitcen and 
Frontex) and ensuring stringent coordination between them by the Standing Committee on 
Operation Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI). The only guideline presented by the ISS 
that even partially dealt with rule of law-related aspects was entitled “Ensuring the effective 
democratic and judicial supervision of security activities”. The latter referred in rather general 
terms to the importance of the involvement of the European Parliament and national 
parliaments, and referred to the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.
4 
Apart from that, the ISS did not specify the actual ways in which the specific guidelines were 
going to constitute an implementation of the above-mentioned general principles. Moreover, as 
we will develop in the next Section, the Commission Communication putting the ISS into action 
has gone even further by completely neglecting the fundamental rights and rule of law 
dimensions amongst its five strategic objectives.  
The Treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm Programme have provided the legal and political 
impetus for the ISS to be developed and implemented. The Commission Communication thus 
comes indeed at a moment when there is much clearer responsibility within the EU institutions 
on competence for internal security generally; the framework of member state/EU institution 
activity is more precisely delineated and the balance of powers among the EU institutions 
following the augmentation of the European Parliament’s competences by the Lisbon Treaty is 
beginning to become apparent. That notwithstanding the new institutional and legislative 
framework provided by the Treaty of Lisbon has not meant a formal end to the third pillar ‘way 
of working and thinking’ on issues of security at EU level. On the contrary, when reading the 
ISS and the Communication aiming at putting it into action, it appears as if the old third pillar 
spirit is not only very much present but it is also now contaminating other (formerly considered) 
first pillar areas, such as for instance those of external border controls and migration/asylum 
policies as well as agencies such as Frontex. The ‘depillarization’ emerging from the Lisbon 
Treaty is allowing for the extension of the police and insecurity-led (intergovernmental) 
approach to spread over the entire EU’s AFSJ and not – as it might have been originally 
expected – the other way around (the Community method of cooperation logic to expand over 
internal security matters). This, of course, raises concerns over the greater effectiveness, 
democratic accountability and judicial control as well as rule of law/fundamental rights 
consequences that the end of the pillar divide in JHA policies was expected to bring at EU level 
and that seem to be now at stake.  
The former ‘third pillar’ policies (police and criminal justice) are amongst those in the new Title 
V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) where more exceptions to 
the general rules and ‘flexibility’ mechanisms have been allowed in European cooperation. This 
will further enhance the intergovernmental and ‘police-led’ motif of future EU security 
measures. Not only the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security 
remain exclusively a matter of national competence under the Treaties, but there are a number 
of important derogations from the expansion of the Community method of cooperation over 
these domains. As a way of illustration, “cooperation between police, customs and other 
specialized law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of 
criminal offences” remains under unanimity and mere consultation with the European 
Parliament. This goes along with the possibility offered to EU member states to use ‘emergency 
brakes’ and/or enhanced cooperation (such as for instance in relation to the setting up of the 
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European Public Prosecutor Office). Or the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to review 
the validity and proportionality of operations carried out by the police and other law-
enforcement authorities and the Protocol 36 on Transitional Provisions (Article 10).
5 Overall, 
the exceptions permitted by the Treaty of Lisbon on EU AFSJ (security) policies will not only 
allow for the continuation of ‘Third Pillar’ ways of working in JHA domains. It is also expected 
to increase the insecurity and vulnerability of the individual, which depending on her/his 
geographical location in the EU will be facing different degrees of European rights and 
freedoms.  
2.  The Communication putting the ISS into Action: An evidence-based 
and shared agenda? 
The Commission’s position on an EU ISS presented in the Commission Communication The 
EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe 
(COM(2010)673) of 22 November 2010 commences with a series of arguments that move in 
one direction only: first, there is a need for ‘more security’ (never defined but quite clearly not 
including social security), and secondly the EU27 member states share a common framework 
based on convergence of ‘security threats’ which provides the objective framework for a 
common ISS. 
These assumptions need to be examined on the basis of the available evidence. One 
shortcoming of the Communication is a tendency for assertions about factual matters to be 
included which lack any indication of the evidential basis on which they repose. It is critically 
important that the EU develop policy on the basis of the best research, analysis and evidence 
available in whichever field is under discussion. Indeed, the EU itself is an important actor in 
funding research on all the areas of its competences (and many others) which is carried out at 
universities and research institutes across the world. Much EU (social sciences) research 
attention and funding has been directed at security-related issues. It would well behove the EU 
institutions (and particularly the European Commission) to examine this body of knowledge in 
the formulation of policy and to address the existing gap between the findings of these research 
projects and the ISS. It is also central that the EU continues to support independent social 
sciences and humanities research projects, which while perhaps not being ‘policy-driven’ 
(already-decided) by EU policy priorities of the day, might however be extremely ‘policy-
relevant’ in pointing out main issues and dilemmas of these very policy choices, and offer 
independent evidence calling at times for a reconfiguration and reframing of the priorities and 
agendas.  
As regards the issue of security and the people, we cannot resist commencing with what we call 
‘the conundrum of security’: a middle-aged man finds himself in a foreign city late at night on a 
quiet street. He sees a policeman and he is reassured. The same man finds himself again on the 
same street late at night and sees two policemen walking together. He is reassured. The same 
man is once again on the street of the foreign city late at night and he sees 50 policemen coming 
towards him; he turns and runs as fast as he can in the opposite direction. The purpose of this 
anecdote is to set the stage – ‘more security’ is not always reassuring for the EU citizen.  
The Communication continues by highlighting the importance it attaches to the rule of law, 
fundamental rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU is indeed, according to 
its treaty, founded on the principle of rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights. 
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Although the UK has a somewhat sui generis protocol which purports to limit the application of 
the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU, as the Charter itself states that it does not 
more than bring together in one place rights which people already enjoy in the EU by virtue of 
other treaties, for the purposes of this submission, the exact status of the Charter in the UK is 
only marginally relevant. Sadly, the Communication does not return to this matter which is 
perhaps the most important one to consider. The sensitive issues that are dealt with in the 
Communication include a number which have been the subject of important judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – for instance on privacy the decision in S & 
Marper v UK
6 where the ECtHR found the UK’s DNA and other biometric information 
database inconsistent with the right to privacy in Article 8 ECHR. Similarly, the same court 
found, in Quinton and Gillan v UK,
7 that the wide anti-terrorism measures permitting the police 
stop and search powers unfettered by the need for a reasonable suspicion too wide to be 
compatible with the same provision of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
More attention to the matter of correct application of fundamental rights duties of member states 
in the internal security policies would help states to avoid these errors in the application of their 
national policies. 
The Commission identifies five key themes (strategic objectives) which form the pillars of the 
ISS and around which it is structured: 1. disrupt organised crime; 2. prevent terrorism; 3. raise 
levels of security in cyberspace; 4. strengthen external borders management; and 5. increase 
EU’s resilience to natural disasters .The first question that needs to be addressed is the extent to 
which these five issues, all of which are concerns for at least some member states, are concerns 
for all EU member states and the extent to which the issues share common aspects in the 27 
member states at all. 
2.1.  Organised Crime in the EU27 
As regards organised crime, it is apparent that there are very wide differences regarding this 
across the member states. The EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) was 
established following the recommendation of the Hague Programme (the five-year plan for the 
AFSJ 2004-09).
8 In its 2009 report, it states that there are five criminal hubs with a wide 
influence on criminal market dynamics in the EU. These are the North West criminal hub which 
acts as a distribution centre for heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs but influences the UK, 
Ireland, France Spain, Germany and the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. The South West hub 
is formed around the Iberian Peninsula and the issues for this hub are cocaine, cannabis, 
trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration. The North East hub, which borders the 
Russian Federation, and Belarus, engages in human trafficking (women for sex) irregular 
immigrants, cigarettes, counterfeit goods, synthetic drugs and heroin. The Southern criminal 
hub is based in Italy; where in addition to drugs and irregular migration it is involved in genuine 
and counterfeit cigarettes and the production and distribution of counterfeit euros. The South 
East criminal hub centred in Bulgaria and Romania is involved in drugs, heroin, counterfeit 
euros and payment card fraud.
9 What is interesting from this summary for the purposes of the 
ISS around organised crime are the wide differences across the EU, which are evident even in a 
report designed to highlight synergies and homogeneity in the Union. There is clearly much 
competition in the field of organised crime and different parts of the EU face very different 
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challenges. Any one-size-fits-all approach to policy is therefore likely to be highly 
counterproductive. 
2.2.  Terrorism in the EU 
Turning then to terrorism, there do not appear to be very many member states that are touched 
by terrorist acts and those that are appear to be concerned primarily with local terrorism. 
According to TE-SAT 2010, the EU’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,
10 in 2009, six 
member states
11 reported a total of 294 failed, foiled or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks 
and the UK reported 124 attacks in Northern Ireland. Only one ‘Islamist’ attack was reported (in 
Italy), while France reported 89 Separatist attacks and Spain 148. The next largest category of 
attacks was under the heading ‘Left Wing’ with 15 in Greece and 23 in Spain. Clearly, the vast 
majority of terrorist acts reported in the member states relate to various separatist groups active 
primarily in particular parts of the affected member states. The issues are so intricately related to 
specific local or national political issues which are only fully accessible to the national and local 
authorities that to call terrorism in the EU a common issue is problematic. Certainly there is 
political violence in the EU, but a single common approach is unlikely to capture the 
specificities of the national and local situations. Further it is an issue that affects less than a third 
of the member states which raises questions about the appropriateness of EU budgetary 
expenditure on the subject. 
2.3.  Cybercrime and the EU 
Data regarding cybercrime are fairly limited. The Commission produced a Communication 
towards a general policy on the fight against cybercrime in 2007,
12 in which it most helpfully 
sought to clarify what it is (including computer crime, computer-related crime, high-tech crime 
and other possible synonyms). Most importantly, it covers traditional forms of crime (such as 
forgery and fraud) carried out over electronic communications networks, the publication of 
illegal content and crimes to electronic networks such as attacks on information systems, denial 
of service and hacking. The Commission, rightly, identified the problem as one for the criminal 
justice systems of the member states as the issues that hamper coercive action against 
cybercrime relate to the jurisdictional limitations of criminal justice systems. The 
Communication also recognizes that by its very nature, cybercrime is not limited to member 
states but may commence on the other side of the world. It can only be classified as crime if the 
places where it takes place have in their criminal code offences that encompass the activities 
which some EU member states consider crimes. The current situation regarding the 2010 
WikiLeaks revelations, which are subject to very different legal regimes depending on which 
country is host to the WikiLeaks activities, highlights the problem.  
The private sector is particularly engaged with this aspect of the ISS. Cybercrime is most 
problematic for industry, although of course it touches citizens as well. The Commission’s 
Communication finishes with an ambitious list of activities to be undertaken. However, 
according to the Council’s document base, not much appears to have happened. There are 
Conclusions in September 2008 which call for a working strategy against cybercrime and 
enhanced public-private partnership regarding the issue. In 2009 the Dutch Delegation presented 
its position on fighting cybercrime which places particular importance on coordination of the 
action with the Council of Europe. However, on 14 and 15 June 2010, following a conference in 
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The Hague, a European Union Cybercrime Task Force has been established under the aegis of 
Europol. 
2.4.  The EU’s External Borders 
For the UK, the issue of the external borders of the EU is a delicate matter as it does not 
participate in the EU’s common actions and indeed is excluded from participation in the EU’s 
external border agency Frontex. For the rest of the member states, the EU’s external border 
commences at the UK’s border. Thus common issues of border controls are somewhat irrelevant 
for the UK as regards to EU’s Internal Security Policy as it is on the outside. 
According to the Council, there were an estimated 355 million entries by persons into the 
Schengen area in 2009.
13 Of these people entering, about 105 million were third country 
nationals (approximately 61 million non-visa nationals and the rest visa nationals). According to 
Frontex, over the first three months of 2010, 14,200 detections of irregular external border 
crossings were reported.
14 A yearly figure on that basis is 56,800 irregular external border 
crossings. Further irregular border crossings in the first three months of 2010 dropped by 36% 
in comparison with the final quarter of 2009. The disproportionate nature of the two figures – 
the 61 million third country nationals who enter the Schengen area annually, against the 
approximately 56,000 people who are treated as entering irregularly most graphically indicates 
that border crossing by individuals is not a security issue in the EU. It is a matter of trade and 
tourism, industry and family relations. To the extent that there is a security dimension at all, this 
is in relation to travel infrastructure. The external border of the EU most properly facilitates the 
entry and exit of people who seek to enter the EU whether they are citizens of the Union or third 
country nationals. The number of people who are treated as inadmissible and thus seeking to 
enter irregularly is statistically insignificant. In an EU of over 500 million people, there is a real 
need for a sense of proportion regarding the policy area of irregular migration.  
2.5. Natural  Disasters 
Natural disasters are a subject where there is perhaps greater scope for common approaches. 
The eruption of a volcano in Iceland certainly showed many EU citizens, wherever they were in 
the world, the need for more consistent and coherent consular protection and assistance in the 
face of such disasters. The fact that many EU citizens were stranded in far-off countries, were 
provided highly misleading information by government departments of some member states and 
felt abandoned by their authorities and unable to access the assistance of the authorities of other 
member states leads to the conclusion that we could do much better in this regard. 
3.  Conclusions: Towards a European Liberty Strategy 
A European ISS must be built on the basis of evidence and analysis of the security interests of 
the people of Europe as well as the added value and effects of new (internal security) policy 
strategies. It must not be promoted on the basis of a lack of information and data or a wilful 
misrepresentation of the available data. This has been also highlighted by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), which has called for a systematic approach in these areas 
(ensuring consistency and clear relations between all policies and initiatives in the area of home 
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affairs and internal security) instead of an ‘incident-driven policy-making’.
15 Moreover, it may 
be easy for some parts of the media (and sadly also some EU leaders and politicians) to fan fears 
about irregular migrations, terrorist threats and organised crime among the people of Europe, 
but such irresponsible behaviour helps neither EU citizens to understand their world, nor policy-
makers to promote sound and measured policy responses.  
All five strategic objectives that the Commission Communication proposes as core pillars reveal 
substantial variations across the member states whether it regards relevance to some member 
states at all, fundamental heterogeneity or insignificance. This, in our view, challenges 
assertions referring to a common EU model on internal security. Another issue of concern is 
that the strategy proposed by the Council and followed up by the European Commission is to 
bring back (through the back door) the old ‘third pillar’ logic of cooperation on JHA (police and 
insecurity-driven policies) and spread it throughout the Freedom, Security and Justice domains, 
including policies and EU agencies dealing with migration, asylum and external borders.  
Will the ISS make the EU more secure or insecure? The ISS offers little in terms of new or 
innovative policy initiatives towards meeting the challenges that the Union will increasingly 
face in delivering liberty and security to individuals across the EU. The field of an ISS which 
touches all member states and touches a central concern of the people of Europe is the one least 
developed in the specific actions – promoting the Rule of Law and fundamental rights as the 
central planks of an EU ISS. By not addressing these elements, the strategy will lead to more 
insecurity for the individuals subject to these public policy responses. In light of this, the 
strategy could therefore be re-labelled: the European Insecurity Strategy. Indeed, as the former 
UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has so eloquently explained, the 
essential element for any community to be secure is the uncompromising championship of Rule 
of Law and human rights. When people know that their rights are protected by law, law 
enforcement officials are secure in the knowledge that their actions are fully compatible with 
fundamental rights and the accused are guaranteed a fair trial, a truly effective ISS will be 
achieved. In such an environment, criminal gangs are unable to extort money from people as the 
police will defend the citizen, corrupt officials cannot prosper as the fundamental right of the 
citizen to transparency will uncover the corruption and law enforcement agents will act in the 
interest of the Rule of Law.  
Formalistic statements on the way in which Europe guarantees and respects human rights and 
the rule of law are not enough and call for constant (evolving) efforts at meeting the liberty-
related challenges posed by new EU and national public policy responses. The EU’s ISS should 
be built around the objective of delivering to everyone living in the EU the twin rights of Rule 
of Law and protection of Fundamental Rights. A solid rule of law and liberty strategy (model) 
should be jointly devised by the Directorate General of Justice, Citizenship and Fundamental 
Rights of the European Commission along with the one put forward on ‘insecurity’ by Home 
Affairs. Such a strategy should be not only focus on the development of better (fundamental 
rights) monitoring and – ex ante and ex post – evaluation of EU policies (and practices) and 
their national implementation.
16 It should also ensure a more integrated cooperation and 
coordination between EU (freedom) agencies, such as the European Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA), the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the European Ombudsman, 
etc. The FRA should make use of its current (post-Treaty of Lisbon) powers to assess the ISS 
from a fundamental rights perspective and it should also see its competences expanded as 
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regards independent and objective evaluation (not only research activities) of EU policies 
covering in particular the domains of police cooperation and criminal justice.
17 All this should 
go hand-in-hand with strengthening the democratic accountability (and EU parliamentary 
representativeness) in the activities and cooperation by EU security agencies and of the 
coordination role played by the COSI. 
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partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	act	as	a	forum	for	discussion	among	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process
•	 To	provide	a	regular	flow	of	authoritative	
publications	offering	policy	analysis	and	
recommendations.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	our	
publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Multidisciplinary,	multinational	&	multicultural	
research	team.	
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Seven	research	networks,	comprising	numerous	
other	highly	reputable	institutes,	to	complement	
and	consolidate	CEPS’	research	expertise	and	to	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	Corporate	and	
Institutional	Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	
practical	experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	
for	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies •	
Financial	Markets	&	Institutions •	
Energy	&	Climate	Change	 •	
Regulatory	Policy •	
EU	Foreign,	Security	&	Neighbourhood	Policy •	
Justice	&	Home	Affairs •	
Politics	&	Institutions •	
Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy •	
Research	Networks
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI) •	
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP) •	
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI) •	
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation		 	 •	
	 (ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy		 	 •	
	 Research	Institutes	(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN) •	
European	Security	Forum	(ESF) •	
CEPS	organises	a	variety	of	activities,	involving	its	
members	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	European	
policy	debate,	including	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	
NGOs	and	the	media.	Its	funding	is	obtained	
from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	membership	
fees,	project	research,	foundation	grants,	
conferences	fees,	publication	sales	and	an	annual	
grant	from	the	European	Commission.